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Abstract
We address the following question in this pa-
per: “What are the most robust statistical
methods for social choice?” By leveraging
the theory of uniformly least favorable distri-
butions in the Neyman-Pearson framework to
finite models and randomized tests, we char-
acterize uniformly most powerful (UMP) tests,
which is a well-accepted statistical optimality
w.r.t. robustness, for testing whether a given al-
ternative is the winner under Mallows’ model
and under Condorcet’s model, respectively.
1 INTRODUCTION
Suppose a group of seven friends want to choose restau-
rant a, b, or c for dinner. Each person uses a ranking over
the restaurants to represent his or her preferences. Three
people rank a  b  c, three people rank b  c  a,
and one people ranks a  c  b. Suppose their prefer-
ences are correlated and are based on their perception of
the quality of the restaurants—the higher the quality of
a restaurant, the more likely a person will rank it high.
Which restaurant should they choose?
Similar problems exist in a wide range of group decision-
making scenarios such as political elections (Condorcet,
1785), meta-search engines (Dwork et al., 2001), recom-
mender systems (Ghosh et al., 1999), and crowdsourc-
ing (Mao et al., 2013). Such problems at the intersection
of statistics and social choice can be dated back to Con-
dorcet’s Jury Theorem in the 18th century (Condorcet,
1785). The Jury Theorem states that when there are
two alternatives, assuming that the votes are generated
i.i.d. from a simple statistical model, then the outcome
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of majority voting converges to the ground truth as the
number of voters goes to infinity.
However, the Jury Theorem does not identify the optimal
decision-making rule, especially when there are three al-
ternatives or more. From a statistical point of view, defin-
ing the optimality measure is highly nontrivial and con-
troversial. If we use likelihood of a parameter as the mea-
sure, then we may pursue the likelihoodist approach. If
we view the ground truth parameter as a random variable,
and use expected loss w.r.t. the posterior distribution over
the parameters as the measure, then we may pursue the
Bayesian approach. If we believe that the ground truth
is deterministic and unknown, and want to measure the
performance of a given rule, then we may pursue the fre-
quentist approach.1 At a high level, the frequentist ap-
proach tries to measure and design the most robust rule,
as Efron (2005) noted: “a frequentist is a Bayesian trying
to do well, or at least not too badly, against any possible
prior distribution”.
Most previous work in the literature of statistical ap-
proaches to social choice pursued either an MLE ap-
proach or an Bayesian approach. We are not aware of
the application of a widely-applied modern frequentists’
decision-making technique—optimal statistical hypothe-
sis testing—to social choice. In the celebrated Neyman-
Pearson framework of statistical hypothesis testing (see,
e.g. the book by Lehmann and Romano (2008)), a statis-
tical model is given and the decision-maker first chooses
two non-overlapping subsets of ground truth parameters
H0, H1, where H0 is called the null hypothesis and H1
is called the alternative hypothesis. Then the decision-
maker designs a test for H0 vs. H1, in the form of a
critical function f , to make a binary decision in {0, 1}
for each observed data. Here 1 means that H0 should be
1The three approaches differ in philosophy of probability
and measure of rules. The same rule, for example the MLE
(MAP with uniform prior for Bayesians), might be used in all
three approaches due to its optimality w.r.t. the three measures
under certain conditions.
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rejected and 0 means that there is a lack of evidence to
rejectH0. We note that the role ofH0 andH1 are not the
same, namely a A vs. B test is different from a B vs. A
test.
While many generic hypothesis testing methods can
be applied, such as the generalized likelihood ratio
tests (Hoeffding, 1965; Zeitouni et al., 1992), how to
make an optimal social choice w.r.t. frequentists’ mea-
sure is still an open question.
Our Contributions. We answer the question of opti-
mal hypothesis testing for social choice by characterizing
uniformly most powerful (UMP) tests for various com-
binations of H0 and H1 for winner determination un-
der two popular models for rank data: Mallows’ model
and Condorcet’s model. UMP is a strong notion of op-
timality for hypothesis testing. A test f is evaluated by
two criteria: its size (or level of significance), which is
its worst-case probability to wrongly reject H0, and its
power, which is its probability to correctly reject H0.
The power of a test is evaluated at each h1 ∈ H1. A
level-α test f is a UMP test, if it has the highest power at
every h1 ∈ H1 among all tests whose sizes are no more
than α.
We focus on two types of tests for a given alternative
a: the non-winner tests, where H0 represents a being
the winner2; and the winner tests, where H1 represents
a being the winner. Our main results are summarized in
Table 1.
Non-winner
(H0 = {a wins})
Winner
(H1 = {a wins})
Mallows Y&N (Thm. 1, 2) Y&N (Thm. 3,4,5)
Condorcet Y&N (Thm. 6, 7) Y (Thm. 8)
Table 1: UMP tests for Mallows’ model and Condorcet’s
model. “Y” in Condorcet-Winner means that for any 0 <
α < 1, there exists a level-α UMP winner test for H1 vs. H1.
“Y&N” means that for some α, no level-α UMP test exists for
H0 = H1; but a UMP test exists for all levels for some natural
special cases.
For example, “Y&N” in Mallows-Non-winner in Table 1
means that for some α, no level-α UMP test exists for
H0 vs. H0, where H0 consists of rankings where a given
alternative a is ranked at the top. On the other hand, for
some H1, a level-α UMP test exists for all 0 < α < 1.
In fact, Theorem 2 characterizes all such H1’s.
In particular, we obtained a complete characterizations of
H1 for which UMP non-winner tests (that is, when H0
models “a wins”) exist, under Mallows’ model (Theo-
2This setting is called a “non-winner test” because whenH0
is rejected, a should not be selected as the winner.
rem 2) and under Condorcet’s model (Theorem 7). Tech-
nically, to obtain the characterizations, we leverage the
theory of uniformly least favorable distributions to finite
models and randomized tests (Lemma 3, 4, 6, 7). These
lemmas generalize the key theorems by Reinhardt Rein-
hardt (1961) that only hold for continuous parameter
space, and they might be of independent interest.
Significance of results. Our results provide the first the-
oretical characterization of robust social choice w.r.t. fre-
quentists’ measure. Practically, the UMP winner tests
in the Condorcet-Winner column can be used for testing
whether a given alternative a is a winner by appropriately
setting H0 while fixing H1 to represent “a wins”.
Proof techniques. This paper focuses on composite
vs. composite tests, where both H0 and H1 contain
more than one element. Many results in this paper are
proved by applying Lemma 2 (Theorem 3.8.1 and Corol-
lary 3.8.1 in (Lehmann and Romano, 2008)), which of-
fers necessary and sufficient conditions for composite
vs. simple tests. However, applying Lemma 2 is more
challenging than it appears—the key is to come up with
a uniformly least favorable distribution that satisfies the
conditions in Lemma 2 for all elements in H1, and such
distribution is not guaranteed to exist. As we show later
in the paper, such distributions indeed exist for non-
winner tests for Mallows’ model and Condorcet’s model
respectively, and it is non-trivial to verify that they sat-
isfy conditions in Lemma 2. In fact, to this end, we
proved new properties (Lemma 5 and Lemma 8 in the
appendix) about Mallows’ model and new general theo-
rems (Lemma 6 and 7) that can be applied to Condorcet’s
model, which might be of independent interest.
Related Work and Discussions. Marden (1995) ap-
plied the Neyman-Pearson Lemma (Lemma 1) for sim-
ple vs. simple tests under Mallows, as illustrated in Ex-
ample 2. Most previous work in statistical approaches
in social choice focused on extending the Condorcet
Jury Theorem and proving asymptotic results (Gerlinga
et al., 2005; Nitzan and Paroush, 2017). Previous
work focused on using commonly-studied voting rules
designed for elections (Conitzer and Sandholm, 2005;
Caragiannis et al., 2016), maximum likelihood estima-
tors (Conitzer and Sandholm, 2005; Xia and Conitzer,
2011), or Bayesian estimators (Young, 1988; Procac-
cia et al., 2012; Pivato, 2013; Elkind and Shah, 2014;
Azari Soufiani et al., 2014; Xia, 2016). We are not aware
of a previous work on UMP tests for deciding whether a
given alternative wins or not in social choice context.
Compared to previous MLE and Bayesian approaches
to social choice, optimal rules characterized in this pa-
per are more robust because it offers the best worst-case
guarantee against an adversary who controls the ground
truth parameter. As in the general Bayesian vs. Frequen-
tists debate, this does not mean that one approach is bet-
ter than another, because the measures of performance
are different.
2 PRELIMINARIES
Let A = {a1, . . . , am} denote a set of m ≥ 2 alterna-
tives and let L(A) denote the set of all linear orders over
A. Let n denote the number of agents. Each agent’s pref-
erences are represented by a linear order in L(A). We
often use V = [a  b  · · · ] to denote a ranking, and
write a V b if a is preferred to b in V . Let Pn denote
the collection of n agents’ votes, called an (n-)profile.
For any profile P and any pair of alternatives a, b, we let
P (a  b) denote the number of votes in P where a is
preferred to b.
The weighted majority graph (WMG) of P , denoted by
WMG(P ), is a directed weighted graph where the weight
wP (a  b) on any edge a → b is wP (a  b) = P (a 
b) − P (b  a). By definition wP (a  b) = −wP (b 
a). For example, the WMG of the profile P7 of seven
linear orders mentioned in the beginning of Introduc-
tion has weights wP7(a  b) = wP7(a  c) = 1 and
wP7(b  c) = 5.
Statistical Models for Rank Data. A statistical model
M = (S,Θ, ~pi) has three parts: the sample space S,
which is composed of all possible data; the parameter
space Θ; and the probability distributions ~pi = {piθ :
θ ∈ Θ}. If both S and Θ contain finitely many elements,
then we callM a finite model. For any pair of linear or-
ders V,W inL(A), let KT(V,W ) denote the Kendall-tau
distance, which is the total number of pairwise disagree-
ments between V and W . Formally,
KT(V,W ) = #
{ {a, b} ⊆ A : [a V b and b W a]
or [b V a and a W b]
}
Definition 1 (Mallows’ model with fixed disper-
sion (Mallows, 1957)) Given the dispersion 0 <
ϕ < 1, Mallows’ model is denoted by MMa =
(L(A)n,L(A), ~pi), where n linear orders are i.i.d. gen-
erated, the parameter space is L(A) and for any V,W ∈
L(A), piW (V ) = 1ZϕKT(V,W ), where Z is the normaliza-
tion factor.
Condorcet’s model differs from Mallows’ model by al-
lowing ties in the ground truth and in data. Formally, let
B(A) denote the set of all irreflexive, antisymmetric, and
total binary relations over A. We have L(A) ⊆ B(A)
and the Kendall-tau distance is extended to B(A) by
counting the number of pairwise disagreements.
Definition 2 (Condorcet’s model for binary relations
with fixed dispersion) Given the dispersion 0 <
ϕ < 1, Condorcet’s model is denoted by MCo =
(B(A)n,B(A), ~pi), where the parameter space is B(A)
and for any W ∈ B(A) and V ∈ B(A), piW (V ) =
1
Zϕ
KT(V,W ), where Z is the normalization factor.
In classical Condorcet’s model (Condorcet, 1785; Young,
1988), the sample space consists of linear orders and the
parameter space consists of binary relations. The model
in Definition 2 is a variant of Condorcet’s model, where
the sample space consists of binary relations. In other
words, each agent is allowed to use a binary relation to
represent his or her preferences—transitivity is not re-
quired as in classical Condorcet’s model or Mallows’
model.
Statistical Hypothesis Testing: The Neyman-
Pearson Framework. Given a statistical model
M = (S,Θ, ~pi), the decision-maker first chooses two
non-overlapping subsets of parameters H0, H1 ⊆ Θ,
where H0 is called the null hypothesis and H1 is called
the alternative hypothesis. The goal of hypothesis
testing is to decide whether the ground truth parameter is
in H0 (retaining the null hypothesis) or in H1 (rejecting
the null hypothesis), based on the observed data P ∈ S.
To simplify notation, we let 0 denote retain and let 1
denote reject. A test is characterized by a (randomized)
critical function f : S → [0, 1] such that for any
P ∈ S , with probability f(P ) the outcome of testing is
1 (reject). When H0 (or H1) contains a single parameter,
it is called a simple hypothesis; otherwise it is called a
composite hypothesis.
A test f is often evaluated by its size and power. The
size of f is the maximum probability for f to wrongly
outputs 1 when the ground truth is in H0 (such cases are
called Type I errors or false positives), where the max
is taken over all parameters in H0. More precisely, for
any h0 ∈ H0, we let Size(f, h0) = EP∼pih0 f(P ), and
Size(f) = suph0∈H0 Size(f, h0). If the size of f is α,
then f is called a level-α test. For any h1 ∈ H1, the
power of f at h1 is the probability that f correctly out-
puts 1 when the ground truth is h1. More precisely, we
let Power(f, h1) = EP∼pih1 f(P ), where the expectation
is take over randomly generated profiles from pih1 . We
would like a test f to have low size and high power, but
often tradeoffs must be made.
Example 1 Let MMa denote a Mallows’ model with
m = 3 and n = 1. Let A = {1, 2, 3}, h1 = [1  2  3],
and let H0 denote the other rankings. Let f be a test
where f(1  2  3) = 1, f(2  1  3) = f(1 
3  2) = 0.5, and f outputs 0 for all other rankings. We
have Size(f) = Size(f, 2  1  3) = Size(f, 1  3 
2) = (0.5+ϕ+0.5ϕ2)/Z, where Z is the normalization
factor. Power(f, 1  2  3) = (1 + ϕ)/Z.
Given a statistical modelM, H0, a parameter h1 6∈ H0,
and 0 < α < 1, a level-α most powerful test fα is a test
with the highest power among all tests whose size is no
more than α. For finite H0, a most powerful test always
exists and may not be unique. For composite H1, it is
possible that for different h1 ∈ H1, the most powerful
tests are different. If there exists a level-α test fα that is
most powerful for all h1 ∈ H1, then f is called a level-
α uniformly most powerful (UMP) test for H0 vs. H1.
UMP is a strong notion of optimality and a UMP test
may not exists.
For simple H0 vs. simple H1, that is, |H0| = |H1| = 1,
the fundamental lemma of Neyman and Pearson charac-
terizes the most powerful tests as likelihood ratio tests,
defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Likelihood ratio test) Given a model M
and 0 < α < 1. For any h0, h1 ∈ Θ with h0 6= h1 and
any P ∈ S, we let Ratioh0,h1(P ) = pih1 (P )pih0 (P ) denote the
likelihood ratio of P and let
LRα,h0,h1(P ) =
 1 if Ratioh0,h1(P ) > kα0 if Ratioh0,h1(P ) < kα
γα if Ratioh0,h1(P ) = kα
,
denote the level-α likelihood ratio test, where kα ≥ 0
and γα are chosen such that Size(LRα,h0,h1) = α.
Lemma 1 (The Neyman-Pearson Lemma, see
e.g. (Lehmann and Romano, 2008)) For any simple
vs. simple test (h0 vs. h1) and any 0 < α < 1, the
likelihood ratio test LRα,h0,h1 is a level-α most powerful
test. Moreover, any most powerful test must agree with
LRα,h0,h1 except on P ∈ S with Ratioh0,h1(P ) = kα.
Example 2 Given a Mallows’ model. Let H0 =
{h0} and H1 = {h1}. For any n-profile Pn, we
have Ratio(Pn) = ϕ
KT(Pn,h1)
ϕKT(Pn,h0)
= ϕKT(Pn,h1)−KT(Pn,h0).
Therefore, it follows from the Neyman-Pearson lemma
that for any 0 < α < 1, there exist Kα and Γα such that
the following test fα is a level-α most powerful test: for
any n-profile Pn,
fα(Pn) =
 1 if KT(Pn, h0)− KT(Pn, h1) > Kα0 if KT(Pn, h0)− KT(Pn, h1) < Kα
Γα if KT(Pn, h0)− KT(Pn, h1) = Kα
.

For composite H0 vs simple H1 = {h1}, a generaliza-
tion of the Neyman-Pearson lemma exists. The idea is
to use a distribution Λ over H0 to compress H0 into a
“combined” parameter, defined as follows.
Definition 4 For anyM = (S,Θ, ~pi), any H0 ⊆ Θ, and
any h1 ∈ (Θ \ H0). Let Λ denote a distribution over
H0 whose support set is denoted by Spt(Λ), and let hΛ0
denote a new parameter whose distribution over S is the
probabilistic mixture of {pih0 : h0 ∈ Θ} according to Λ.
For any 0 < α < 1 and any P ∈ S,
• let RatioΛ,h1(P ) = pih1 (P )∑
h0∈H0 Λ(h0)pih0 (P )
, and
• let LRα,Λ,h1(P ) denote the likelihood ratio test for
hΛ0 vs. h1 as in Definition 3.
The following lemma states that LRα,Λ,h1 is a most pow-
erful test for H0 vs. h1 iff two conditions are satisfied.
Lemma 2 (Theorem 3.8.1 and Corollary 3.8. by
Lehmann and Romano (2008)) For composite vs. sim-
ple test (H0 vs. h1) and any distribution Λ over H0, the
likelihood ratio test LRα,Λ,h1 is a level-α most powerful
test if and only if the following two conditions are satis-
fied.
(i) For any h∗0 ∈ Spt(Λ), Size(LRα,Λ,h1 , h∗0) = α.
(ii) For any h0 ∈ H0, Size(LRα,Λ,h1 , h0) ≤ α.
Moreover, if there is no P ∈ S with RatioΛ,h1(P ) = kα,
then LRα,Λ,h1 is the unique level-α most powerful test.
The distribution Λ in Lemma 2 is called a least favorable
distribution. If |Spt(Λ)| = 1, then Λ is called a determin-
istic least favorable distribution. If Λ is a least favorable
distribution for all levels of significance 0 < α < 1, then
it is called a uniformly least favorable distribution (Rein-
hardt, 1961).
3 TEST SETUP AND BASIC LEMMAS
We first introduce two types of hypothesis tests for
choices. Given an alternative a, for Mallows’ model we
define Laothers = {V ∈ L(A) : ∀b ∈ A, a V b};
similarly, for Condorcet’s model we define Raothers =
{V ∈ B(A) : ∀b ∈ A, a V b}. Laothers and Raothers
naturally correspond to a being ranked at the top in the
the ground truth in Mallows’ model and in Condorcet’s
model, respectively.
Definition 5 ((Non-)Winner Tests) Given an alterna-
tive a, in a non-winner test for Mallows’ model, we
let H0 = Laothers; and in a winner test for Mallows’
model, we let H1 = Laothers.
Given an alternative a, in a non-winner test for Con-
dorcet’s model, we let H0 = Raothers; and in a winner
test for Condorcet’s model, we let H1 = Raothers.
The rationale behind the naming of “non-winner” and
“winner” is the following. Because H0 is often chosen
as the devil’s advocate and the goal of testing is often to
reject H0, when setting H0 = Laothers under Mallows’
model, we are hoping to reject H0, which means that a
is not the winner. We note that the decision-maker still
needs to specify H1 in a non-winner test and specify H0
in a winner test. Various natural choices of H1 or H0
will be explored in Section 4 and Section 5.
We now present two general lemmas on least favor-
able distributions that will be frequently used in this
paper. For any model M = (S,Θ, ~pi), any compos-
ite vs. simple test (H0 vs. h1), any distribution Λ over
H0, and any h0 ∈ H0, we define a random variable
XΛh0 : S → R such that for any P ∈ S, Pr(P ) = pih0(P )
and XΛh0(P ) = log RatioΛ,h1(P ). A random variable X
weakly first-order stochastically dominates (weakly dom-
inates for short) another random variable Y , if for all
p ∈ R, Pr(X ≥ p) ≥ Pr(Y ≥ p).
Lemma 3 Λ is a uniformly least favorable distribution
for H0 vs. h1 if and only if for any h∗0 ∈ Spt(Λ) and any
h0 ∈ H0, XΛh∗0 weakly dominates XΛh0 .
Proof: To simplify notation we let LRα and Ratio to
denote LRα,Λ,h1 and RatioΛ,h1 , respectively. For any
0 < α < 1 and any h0 ∈ H0, we have
Size(LRα, h0) =
∑
P∈S:Ratio(P )>kα
pih0(P )
+ γα
∑
P∈S:Ratio(P )=kα
pih0(P )
= Pr(XΛh0 > log kα) + γα Pr(X
Λ
h0 = log kα) (1)
=(1− γα) Pr(XΛh0 > log kα) + γα Pr(XΛh0 ≥ log kα)
=(1− γα) lim
x→log k−α
Pr(XΛh0 ≥ x) + γα Pr(XΛh0 ≥ kα)
The “if” direction: for any h0 ∈ H0 and any h∗0 ∈
Spt(Λ), because XΛh∗0 weakly dominates X
Λ
h0
, we have
that for any x ∈ R, Pr(XΛh∗0 ≥ x) ≥ Pr(XΛh0 ≥
x). It follows from (1) that Size(LRα, h1), h∗0) ≥
Size(LRα, h0). By Lemma 2, LRα is a level-α most
powerful test. Therefore Λ is a uniformly least favorable
distribution.
The “only if” direction: suppose for the sake of con-
tradiction that this is not true. Let h0 ∈ H0 and
h∗0 ∈ Spt(Λ) be such that XΛh∗0 does not weakly domi-
nate XΛh0 . It follows that there exists x ∈ R such that
Pr(XΛh∗0
≥ x) < Pr(XΛh0 ≥ x). Let α = Pr(XΛh∗0 ≥ x).
Because Λ is uniformly least favorable, the size of LRα
must be α, where kα = 2x and γα = 1. By Lemma 2,
Pr(XΛh0 ≥ x) = Size(LRα, h0) ≥ Size(LRα, h∗0) =
Pr(XΛh∗0
≥ x), which is a contradiction. 
Example 3 LetM denote a Mallows’ model with m =
3 and n = 1. Let A = {1, 2, 3}, h1 = [1  2  3]
and let Λ denote the uniform distribution over {[2  1 
3], [1  3  2]}. We will apply Lemma 3 to prove that
Λ is a uniformly least favorable distribution for testing
H0 = (L(A) − {[1  2  3]}) vs. [1  2  3]. The
likelihood ratios of all rankings are summarized in Ta-
ble 2 in the increasing order.
V 3  2  1 others 1  2  3
RatioΛ,123(V ): ϕ 2ϕ1+ϕ2
1
ϕ
Table 2: Likelihood ratios.
For any h1 ∈ H0, XΛh0 takes three values: log 1ϕ ,
log 2ϕ1+ϕ2 , and logϕ. The probabilities for the five ran-
dom variables taking these three values are summarized
in Table 3.
logϕ log 2ϕ1+ϕ2 log
1
ϕ
XΛ132 and X
Λ
213
ϕ2
Z
1+ϕ+ϕ2+ϕ3
Z
ϕ
Z
XΛ231 and X
Λ
312
ϕ
Z
1+ϕ+ϕ2+ϕ3
Z
ϕ2
Z
XΛ321
1
Z
2(ϕ+ϕ2)
Z
ϕ3
Z
Table 3: XΛh0 for all h0 ∈ H0, where Z is the normaliza-
tion factor.
Because 0 < ϕ < 1, it is not hard to verify that XΛ132
and XΛ213 weakly dominate other random variables.
By Lemma 3, Λ is a uniformly least favorable distribu-
tion. 
Our second lemma states that if we can find a determinis-
tic uniformly least favorable distribution for n = 1, then
it is also uniformly least favorable for the same statistical
model with n ≥ 2 i.i.d. samples.
Lemma 4 Suppose Λ is a deterministic uniformly least
favorable distribution for composite vs. simple test (H0
vs. h1) underM = (S,Θ, ~pi). Then for any n ∈ N, Λ is
also a uniformly least favorable distribution for testing
H0 vs. h1 underM = (Sn,Θ, ~pi) with n i.i.d. samples.
All missing proofs can be found in the appendix.
4 UMP TESTS FOR MALLOWS
In this section, we present results on UMP non-winner
and winner tests for Mallows’ model.
Non-Winner Tests for Mallows. The first theorem
(Theorem 1) of this subsection is a warmup, whose main
goal is to define a test fα,a,B that is UMP for any simple
H1 that consists in a linear order where a is not ranked
at the top. The main theorem of this section is Theo-
rem 1, which characterizes all UMP non-winner tests for
arbitrary choices H1.
For any profile P , any B ⊂ A, and any a ∈ (A − B),
we let wP (B  a) =
∑
b∈B wP (b  a), that is, the total
weights on edges from B to a in WMG(P ).
Theorem 1 (A most powerful non-winner test for
Mallows) Given a Mallows’ modelMMa, for any alter-
native a, any ranking h1 where a is not ranked at the top,
any 0 < α < 1, and any n, the following test is a level-α
UMP for testing Laothers vs. h1. For any n-profile Pn,
fα,a,B(Pn) =
 1 if wPn(B  a) > Kα0 if wPn(B  a) < Kα
Γα if wPn(B  a) = Kα
,
where B is the set of alternatives ranked above a in h1,
and Kα and Γα are chosen s.t. the size of fα,a,B is α.
Proof: The proof proceeds by identifying a uniformly
least favorable distribution for H0 = Laothers vs. h1. In
fact, let B denote the set of alternatives ranked above a
in h1. Let h∗0 denote the ranking that is obtained from h1
by raising a to the top position. We will prove that the
deterministic distribution Λ at {h∗0} is a uniformly least
favorable distribution.
Let LRα denote LRα,h∗0 ,h1 and let Ratio denote
Ratioh∗0 ,h1 . Recall that both are defined in Definition 3.
We first prove the theorem for n = 1. By Lemma 3,
it suffices to prove that for any h0 ∈ H0, XΛh∗0 weakly
dominates XΛh0 . For any ranking V and any pair of alter-
natives b, c, we let I(b V c) = 1 if b V c, otherwise
I(b V c) = 0. For any single-vote profile P = {V },
we have:
log Ratio(P ) = (KT(V, h1)− KT(V, h∗0)) logϕ
= logϕ
∑
cV d
(I(d h1 c)− I(d h∗0 c))
= logϕ(
∑
b∈B:aV b
(I(b h1 a)− I(b h∗0 a))
+
∑
b∈B:bV a
(I(a h1 b)− I(a h∗0 b)))
= logϕ · (|B| − 2wP (B  a))
Therefore, to prove that XΛh∗0 weakly dominates X
Λ
h0
, it
suffices to prove for any K ∈ Z,
pih0({P : wP (B  a) ≥ K}) ≤ pih∗0 ({P : wP (B  a) ≥ K})
Let M denote the permutation over A such that
M(h0) = h
∗
0. Because h0 ∈ H0 = Laothers, we have
M(a) = a. Let B′ = M(B). Because Kendall-Tau dis-
tance is invariant to permutations, for any P ∈ L(A) we
have pih0(P ) = piM(h0)(M(P )) and
pih0({P : wP (B  a) ≥ K})
=piM(h0)({M(P ) : wM(P )(M(B) M(a)) ≥ K})
=pih∗0 ({M(P ) : wM(P )(B′ M(a)) ≥ K})
=pih∗0 ({P : wP (B′  a) ≥ K})
Therefore, it suffices to prove that pih∗0 ({P : wP (B′ 
a) ≥ K}) ≤ pih∗0 ({P : wP (B  a) ≥ K}). We will
prove a stronger lemma. Given any W ∈ L(A) and
C ′, C ⊆ A with C 6= C ′ and |C| = |C ′|, we say that
C dominates C ′ w.r.t. W if there exists a one-one map-
ping F : (C − C ′) → (C ′ − C) such that for all c ∈ C
we have c W F (c). In words, C ′ can be obtained from
C by lowering some alternatives according to W .
Lemma 5 Under a Mallows’ model, for any ϕ, anyK ∈
N, any a ∈ A, any W ∈ L(A), and any C ′, C ⊆ A
such that C dominates C ′ w.r.t. W , we have piW ({P :
wP (C
′  a) ≥ K}) ≤ piW ({P : wP (C  a) ≥ K}).
It follows from Lemma 5 that XΛh∗0 weakly dominates
XΛh0 , which means that Λ is a uniformly least favorable
distribution for n = 1 by Lemma 3. We note that Λ is
deterministic. Therefore, by Lemma 4, Λ is also a uni-
formly least favorable distribution for Mallows’ model
with any n ∈ N, which means that the correspond-
ing likelihood ratio test LRα is most powerful. It is
not hard to verify that LRα = fα,a,B . Moreover, be-
cause Λ is deterministic, any most powerful test f for
H0 vs. h1 must also be most powerful for the simple
vs. simple test (h∗0 vs. h1). By the Neyman-Pearson
lemma (Lemma 1), f must agree with LRα except on
Pn such that Ratio(Pn) = kα, which corresponds to Pn
with wPn(B  a) = Kα. 
Theorem 1 can be extended to the following characteri-
zation of all UMP non-winner tests (H0 = Laothers) for
Mallows’ model. For anyB ⊂ A and a ∈ (A\B), we let
LBa ⊆ L(A) denote the set of all rankings where the
set of alternatives ranked above a is exactly B. For ex-
ample, when m = 4, L{c}a = {[c  a  b  d], [c 
a  d  b]}.
Theorem 2 (Characterization of UMP non-winner
tests for Mallows) Given a Mallows’ modelMMa with
m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 2, there exists a UMP test for H0 =
Laothers vs. H1 for all 0 < α < 1 if and only if there
exists B ⊆ A such that H1 ⊆ LBa.
Moreover, when H1 ⊆ LBa, we have that fα,a,B as
defined in Theorem 1 is a UMP test.
Example 4 Let P7 denote the profile mentioned in the
beginning of Introduction. Suppose we want to test
whether there is enough evidence to claim that a can-
not be the winner. We can apply a non-winner test on
a by letting H0 = Laothers and H1 = Lothersa. By
Theorem 2, fα,a,B is a UMP test, where B = {b, c}.
The test can be done by computing the test statistic
T = wP7(B  a) = −2, and then checking if T is in
the critical region (Kα,∞) for some pre-computed Kα.
If T ∈ (Kα,∞), then H0 is rejected, which means that
a should not be chosen as the winner. If T = Kα, then
H0 is rejected with probability Γα. OtherwiseH0 cannot
be rejected, meaning that there is not enough evidence to
claim that a cannot be the winner. 
Winner Tests for Mallows. We now consider UMP win-
ner tests under Mallows’ model (H1 = Laothers) for two
natural choices of H0: H0 = Lothersa in Theorem 3,
which means that a is ranked in the bottom in the ground
truth, andH0 = (L(A)−H1) in Theorem 4 and 5, which
means that a is not ranked at the top in the ground truth.
Theorem 3 (A UMP winner test under Mallows)
Given a Mallows’ model MMa, for any alternative a,
any 0 < α < 1, and any n, the following test is a level-α
UMP for testing H0 = Lothersa vs. H1 = Laothers. For
any n-profile Pn,
fα,a(Pn) =
 1 if wPn(a  others) > Kα0 if wPn(a  others) < Kα
Γα if wPn(a  others) = Kα
,
where Kα and Γα are chosen s.t. the size of fα,a is α.
Proof: For any h1 ∈ H1, we will prove that fα,a is
a most powerful level-α test. Let h∗0 ∈ H0 denote the
ranking that is obtained from h1 by moving a to the bot-
tom position without changing the relative positions of
the other alternatives. Like the proof of Theorem 1, it is
not hard to check that fα,a is equivalent to the likelihood
ratio test LRα,h∗0 ,h1 .
Because fα,a is invariant to permutations over A \ {a},
for any h′0 ∈ H0 and any permutation M over A \ {a},
we have Size(fα,a, h′0) = Size(fα,a,M(h
′
0)). In partic-
ular, let M denote the permutation such that M(h′0) =
h∗0. We have Size(fα,a, h
′
0) = Size(fα,a, h
∗
0). It follows
from Lemma 2 that fα,a is most powerful, by letting Λ
to be the deterministic distribution on {h∗0}. 
Example 5 Let us continue with the setting in Exam-
ple 4. Suppose we want to test whether there is enough
evidence to claim that a is the winner. We can ap-
ply a winner test on a by letting H0 = Lothersa and
H1 = Laothers, i.e. switching the roles of H0 and H1 in
Example 4. By Theorem 3, fα,a is a UMP test. The
test can be done by computing the test statistic T =
wP7(a  others) = 2, and then checking if T is in the
critical region (K∗α,∞) for some pre-computed K∗α. If
T ∈ (K∗α,∞), then H0 is rejected, which means that a
should be chosen as the winner. If T = K∗α, then H0 is
rejected with a pre-computed probability Γ∗α. Otherwise
H0 cannot be rejected, meaning that there is no enough
evidence to claim that a is the winner. 
The following two theorems identify conditions on ϕ in
Mallows’ model for the UMP winner test H0 = (L(A) \
H1) vs. H1 = Laothers when n = 1.
Theorem 4 Let MMa denote a Mallows’ model with
n = 1, any m ≥ 4, and any ϕ < 1/m. There exists
0 < α < 1 such that no level-α UMP test exists for
H0 = (L(A)−H1) vs. H1 = Laothers.
Theorem 5 Let MMa denote a Mallows’ model with
n = 1 and any m ≥ 4. There exists  > 0 such that
for any ϕ > 1 −  and any α, a UMP test exists for
H0 = (L(A)−H1) vs. H1 = Laothers.
5 UMP TESTS FOR CONDORCET
We first prove two general theorems on UMP tests for
statistical models that combine multiple independent
models, and then apply them to characterize UMP tests
under Condorcet’s model.
Definition 6 (Combining two models) Given two mod-
els MX = (SX ,ΘX , ~piX) and MY = (SY ,ΘY , ~piY ),
we letMX ⊗MY = (SX ×SY ,ΘX ×ΘY , ~piX × ~piY ),
where for any (piθX , piθY ) ∈ ~piX×~piY and any PX ∈ SX
and PY ∈ SY , we let (piθX , piθY )(PX , PY ) = piθX (PX) ·
piθY (PY ).
Example 6 Given a Condorcet’s modelMCo with m =
3. Let A = {1, 2, 3}. For any pair of alternatives {a, b},
we letM{a,b} = ({0, 1}n, {0, 1}, ~pi) denote the restric-
tion ofMCo on the pairwise comparison between a and
b. We haveMCo =M{1,2} ⊗M{2,3} ⊗M{1,3}. 
Given two modelsMX andMY , the next theorem pro-
vides a way to leverage a least favorable distribution for
a composite vs. simple test under MX to a least favor-
able distribution for a composite vs. simple test under the
combined modelMX ⊗MY .
Lemma 6 For any pair of models MX and MY , sup-
pose ΛX is a least favorable distribution for compos-
ite vs. simple test (H0,X vs. x1) under MX . For any
y1 ∈ ΘY , let Λ∗ be the distribution over H0,X × ΘY
where for all x ∈ H0,X , Λ∗(x, y1) = ΛX(x). Then,
Λ∗ is a least favorable distribution for H0,X × ΘY
vs. (x1, y1) underMX ⊗MY .
Example 7 Continuing Example 6, we let MX =
M{1,2}, H0,X = {0}, x1 = 1, let ΛX be the determin-
istic distribution over {0}, and letMY =M{2,3}×{1,3}
and y1 = (1, 1). ΛX is a least favorable distribution ac-
cording to the Neyman-Pearson lemma (Lemma 1). Let
Λ∗ denote the deterministic distribution over {(0, 1, 1)}.
It follows from Lemma 6 that Λ∗ is a least favorable
distribution for ({0} × {0, 1}2) vs. (1, 1, 1) under Con-
dorcet’s model. 
The next theorem focuses on the setting where we com-
bine t ∈ N identical statistical models MX . Given
MX = (S,Θ, ~pi), a distribution Λ over Θ, any θ∗ ∈ Θ,
and any t ∈ N, we let (MX)t = MX ⊗ · · · ⊗MX︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
and define the extension of Λ to Θt w.r.t. θ∗, denoted
by Ext(Λ, θ∗, t), as follows. Let ~θ∗ = (θ∗, . . . , θ∗) ∈
Θt. For any j ∈ t and any θ ∈ Θ, we have
Ext(Λ, θ∗, t)(θ, [~θ∗]−j) = 1tΛ(θ). That is, Ext(Λ, θ
∗, t)
generates a vector ~θ ∈ Θt in the following two steps.
First, a number j ≤ t is chosen uniformly at random.
Then, we fix the components of ~θ to be θ∗, except for the
j-th component, which is generated from Θ according to
Λ.
For any H0 ⊆ Θ and any h1 ∈ (Θ \ H0), we let ~h1 =
(h1, . . . , h1︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
) and let Ext(H0, h1, t) = ({H0 ∪ {h1}}t \
{~h1}).
Example 8 In the setting of Example 6, we letMX =
M{1,2}, let Λ denote the deterministic distribution over
{0}, let H0 = {0} and h1 = 1. Then, Ext(Λ, 1, 3) is the
uniform distribution over {(0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1), (1, 1, 0)},
~h1 = (1, 1, 1), and Ext(H0, 1, 3) = ({0, 1}3 \
{(1, 1, 1)}). 
Lemma 7 For any model MX and any t ∈ N, sup-
pose Λ is a uniformly least favorable distribution for
composite vs. simple test (H0 vs. h1) underMX . Then
Ext(Λ, h1, t) is a uniformly least favorable distribution
for Ext(H0, h1, t) vs. ~h1 in (MX)t.
Example 9 In the setting of Example 8, it follows
from Lemma 7 that the uniform distribution over
{(0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1), (1, 1, 0)} is a uniformly least favor-
able distribution for testing Ext(H0, 1, 3) = ({0, 1}3 \
{~1}) vs. ~h1 = (1, 1, 1) under (MX)3, which is the Con-
dorcet’s model with m = 3. 
Non-Winner Tests for Condorcet. We are now ready to
characterize UMP tests for Condorcet’s model by apply-
ing Lemma 6 and 7. Theorem 6 and Theorem 7 of this
section are counterparts of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2
(both are for Mallows’ model), respectively, though the
proof techniques are quite different.
Theorem 6 (A most powerful non-winner test for
Condorcet) Given a Condorcet’s modelMCo with m ≥
2, for any a ∈ A, any h1 ∈ (B(A) \ Raothers), any n,
and any ϕ, the following test is most powerful for testing
Raothers vs. h1. For any n-profile Pn,
gα,a,B(Pn) =
 1 if wPn(B  a) > Kα0 if wPn(B  a) < Kα
Γα if wPn(B  a) = Kα
,
where B is the set of alternatives that are preferred to a
in h1.
Proof: Let h∗0 denote the binary relation obtained from
h1 by enforcing a  b for all b ∈ A. We will prove that
the deterministic distribution over {h∗0} is a uniformly
least favorable distribution for Raothers vs. h1.
Let X = {{a, b} : b 6= a} denote the pairwise com-
parisons between alternatives in A that involve a and let
Y denote the set of all other pairwise comparisons. Let
MX = (SX ,ΘX , ~piX) denote Condorcet’s modelMCo
restricted to X . That is, SX = {0, 1}(m−1)n,ΘX =
{0, 1}m and for any θ ∈ ΘX and any Pn ∈ SX ,
piθ(Pn) ∝ ϕKT(θ,Pn). Similarly, let MY denote Con-
dorcet’s model restricted to Y . It follows that MCo =
MX ⊗MY .
Let h1 = (x1, y1), where x1 ∈ ΘX and y1 ∈ ΘY .
Let x0 ∈ ΘX denote the vector that represents a  b
for all b ∈ A. By Neyman-Pearson lemma (Lemma 1),
the deterministic distribution ΛX = {x0} is a uniformly
least favorable distribution for x0 vs. x1. Therefore, by
Lemma 6, the deterministic distribution Λ = {(x0, y1)}
is uniformly least favorable for {x0} × ΘY vs. (x1, y1).
We note that (x0, y1) = h∗0 and (x1, y1) = h1. It is not
hard to verify that gα,a,B is equivalent to the likelihood
ratio test LRα,Λ,h1 , which is most powerful. The theorem
follows after Lemma 2. 
Subsequently, we have the following characterization of
UMP non-winner tests under Condorcet’s model (H0 =
Raothers). For anyB ⊂ A, we letRBa ⊆ B(A) denote
the set of all binary relations where the set of alternatives
that are preferred to a is B.
Theorem 7 (Characterization of UMP non-winner
tests for Condorcet) Let MCo denote a Condorcet’s
model with any m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 2. There exists a UMP
test for H0 = Raothers vs. H1 for every 0 < α < 1 if
and only if there exists B ⊆ A such that H1 ⊆ RBa.
Moreover, when H1 ⊆ RBa, gα,a,B defined in Theo-
rem 6 is a UMP test.
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2 and is thus
omitted.
Winner Tests for Condorcet. Finally, we turn to UMP
winner tests for Condorcet’s model (H1 = Raothers).
Theorem 8 (A UMP winner test for Condorcet) Let
MCo denote a Condorcet’s model with any m ≥ 2,
any n ≥ 2, and any ϕ. For any α, gα,a defined
below is a level-α UMP test for H0 = (B(A) \ H1)
vs. H1 = Raothers. For any Pn,
gα,a(Pn) =
 1 if Ratio(Pn) > Kα0 if Ratio(Pn) < Kα
Γα if Ratio(Pn) = Kα
,
where Ratio(Pn) =
m− 1∑
b6=a ϕ
wPn (ab)
, and Kα and Γα
are chosen such that the level of gα,a is α.
Proof: LetM1 denote Condorcet’s model with a single
sample. Let X1, . . . , Xm−1 denote the m − 1 pairwise
comparisons between a and other alternatives. Similarly
to the proof of Theorem 6, we let MX1 , . . . ,MXm−1
denote the restriction ofM1 on the m−1 pairwise com-
parisons, and letMY denote the restriction ofMCo on
other pairwise comparisons. In fact, MX1 , . . .MXm−1
are the same model. It follows that MCo = MX1 ⊗
MX2 ⊗ · · · ⊗MXm−1 ⊗MY .
In MX1 , let 1 represent that a is more preferred in
the pairwise comparison. Due to the Neyman-Pearson
lemma (Lemma 1), the deterministic distribution Λ =
{0} is a uniformly least favorable distribution for H0 =
{0} vs. h1 = 1. For any n ∈ N, let MX1,n denote
MX1 with n i.i.d. samples. It follows from Lemma 4
that Λ is still a uniformly least favorable distribution for
MX1,n . By Lemma 7, Ext(Λ, h1,m− 1) is a uniformly
least favorable distribution for Ext(H0, h1,m − 1) =
({0, 1}m−1 \ {~1}) vs. h1 = ~1 under MX1,n ⊗ · · · ⊗
MXm−1,n .
Let MY,n denote the model obtained from MY by us-
ing n i.i.d. samples. For any y1 ∈ ΘY,n, let Λy1 denote
the distribution that is obtained from Ext(Λ, h1,m − 1)
by appending y1 to each parameter. By Lemma 4,
Λy1 is a uniformly least favorable distribution for
Ext(H0, h1,m − 1) × ΘY,n vs. (~1, y1) underMX1,n ⊗
· · ·⊗MXm−1,n⊗MY,n, which is the Condorcet’s model
with n i.i.d. samples. We note that Ext(H0, h1,m−1)×
ΘY,n = ({0, 1}m−1 \ {~1})×ΘY = (B(A) \Raothers).
This means that the likelihood ratio test LRα,Λy1 ,(~1,y1)
is a most powerful level-α test for (B(A) \ Raothers)
vs. (~1, y1). We note that for all y1, LRα,Λy1 ,(~1,y1) is the
same test, which means that it is also UMP. The theorem
is proved after noticing that gα,a = LRα,Λy1 ,(~1,y1). 
6 DISCUSSION: BEYOND BINARY
CHOICE
All UMP tests we have characterized so far are opti-
mal in making binary decisions, such as whether a given
alternative a is the winner. We propose two natural
procedures to choose the winner by combining multi-
ple winner tests (H1 = Laothers for Mallows’ model
and H1 = Raothers for Condorcet’ model) and non-
winner tests (H0 = Laothers for Mallows’ model and
H0 = Raothers for Condorcet’ model).
Procedure based on combining winner tests. We first
choose any winner test, such as a UMP test characterized
in Theorem 3, then find the alternative a with the mini-
mum α such that H0 is rejected in the winner test, by
conducting binary search on α.3 This corresponds at a
high level to choosing the alternative that is most likely
to be the winner according to the tests.
Procedure based on combining non-winner tests.
Similarly, we use binary search on α to find the alter-
native a with the maximum α such that H0 is rejected
in the non-winner test. This corresponds to choosing the
alternative that is mostly unlikely to be a non-winner ac-
cording to the tests.
Interestingly, both procedures correspond to the Borda
voting rule when the proposed UMP tests for Mallows’
model are used: in the UMP winner test we let H0 =
Lothersa vs. H1 = Laothers as in Example 5, and in the
UMP non-winner test we let H0 = Laothers vs. H1 =
Lothersa as in Example 4. This provides a new theoret-
ical justification for the Borda rule; or vice versa, Borda
provides a justification of the proposed procedure.
7 FUTURE WORK
An immediate open question is how to use hypothesis
testing for choosing a winner beyond testing whether a
given alternative is a winner or not, following the initial
thoughts discussed in Section 6. Also, can we character-
ize UMP tests for other goals of social choice, such as
pairwise comparisons? Do UMP tests exist for other sta-
tistical models, such as random utility models? How can
we efficiently compute the results of the proposed tests?
3Co-winners exist if they all reject H0 for the same α.
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8 Appendix: Proofs
Lemma 4. Suppose Λ is a deterministic uniformly least favorable distribution for composite vs. simple test (H0 vs. h1)
underM = (S,Θ, ~pi). Then for any n ∈ N, Λ is also a uniformly least favorable distribution for testing H0 vs. h1
underM = (Sn,Θ, ~pi) with n i.i.d. samples.
Proof: Let Spt(Λ) = {h∗0}. For any n ∈ N and any h0 ∈ H0, we define a random variable Xn,h0 : Sn → R, where
for any Pn ∈ Sn, Pr(Pn) = pih0(Pn) =
∏
V ∈Pn pih0(V ), and Xn,h0(Pn) = log Ratioh∗0 ,h1 . It follows that
Xn,h0 = Xh0 +Xh0 + · · ·+Xh0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
By Lemma 3, for any h0 ∈ H0, Xh∗0 weakly dominates Xh0 . Because first-order stochastic dominance is preserved
under convolution (Deelstra and Plantin, 2014), we have that Xn,h∗0 weakly dominates Xn,h0 . The lemma follows
after applying Lemma 3. 
Remarks. Lemma 4 is an extension of Theorem 2.3 by Reinhardt Reinhardt (1961) to finite models. Reinhardt’s
theorem requires that for any constant t, with measure 0 we have pih∗0 (P ) = tpih1(P ). This is an important assumption
in Reinhardt’s proof because it assumes away cases with Ratio(P ) = kα so that the most powerful test is deterministic.
Unfortunately, this assumption does not hold for finite models and we must deal with randomized tests.
Lemma 5 Under a Mallows’ model, for any ϕ, any K ∈ N, any a ∈ A, any W ∈ L(A), and any C ′, C ⊆ A such
that C dominates C ′ w.r.t. W , we have piW ({P : wP (C ′  a) ≥ K}) ≤ piW ({P : wP (C  a) ≥ K}).
Proof: We first prove the lemma for a special case where C and C ′ differ in only one alternative, that is, |C−C ′| = 1.
Let c ∈ C such that c 6∈ C ′. Let c′ ∈ C ′ such that c′ 6∈ C. Because C dominates C ′ in W , we have c W c′.
Let P = {P ∈ L(A) : wP (C  a) ≥ K} and P ′ = {P ∈ L(A) : wP (C ′  a) ≥ K}. We define the following
permutationM over L(A). For any P ∈ L(A), if c P a P c′ thenM(P ) is the ranking that is obtained from P
by switching c and c′; otherwiseM(P ) = P . Because |C − C ′| = 1, it follows that for any P ∈ P − P ′, we must
have c P a P c′ and (C − C ′) P a. Therefore,M(P − P ′) = P ′ − P .
We now prove that piW (P − P ′) > piW (P ′ − P). For any P ∈ P − P ′, we have c P a P c′, which means that
piW (P ) ≥ piW (M(P ))/ϕ because c W c′. Therefore, piW (P−P ′) > piW (P ′−P) becauseM(P−P ′) = P ′−P .
We have piW (P) = piW (P ∩ P ′) + piW (P − P ′) ≥ piW (P ∩ P ′) + piW (P ′ − P) = piW (P ′).
Therefore, the lemma holds for the case where |C − C ′| = 1. For general C and C ′, because C dominates C ′, there
exists a sequence of sets C = C0, C1, . . . , Cl = C ′ such that for all 0 ≤ i ≤ l − 1, (i) Ci dominates Ci+1; (ii)
|Ci − Ci+1| = 1. It follows that piW ({P : wP (C  a) ≥ K}) ≥ piW ({P : wP (C1  a) ≥ K}) ≥ · · · ≥ piW ({P :
wP (C
′  a) ≥ K}). 
Theorem 2 (Characterization of all UMP non-winner tests under Mallows). Given a Mallows’ modelMMa with
m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 2, there exists a UMP test for H0 = Laothers vs. H1 for all 0 < α < 1 if and only if there exists
B ⊆ A such that H1 ⊆ LBa.
Moreover, when H1 ⊆ LBa, fα,a,B defined in Theorem 1 is a UMP test.
Proof: The “if” part. We note that fα,a,B does not depend on the orderings among alternatives in B in h1. It follows
that for all h1 ∈ H1, fα,a,B is a level-α most powerful test for H0 vs. {h1}, which means that fα,a,B is a UMP test.
The “only if” part. Suppose there exist B,B′ such that B 6= B′ and there exist two rankings h11 = [B  a  others]
and h21 = [B
′  a  others] inH1. W.l.o.g. supposeB′−B 6= ∅. Let α denote the number such thatKα = n|B|−0.5,
Γα = 0, and let fα,a,B denote the most powerful test for H0 vs. h11 guaranteed by Theorem 1. Because Kα is not an
integer, there does not exist Pn such that wPn(B  a) = Kα. This means that fα,a,B is the unique most powerful
level-α test for H0 vs. h11. We observe that for any Pn, fα,a,B(Pn) is either 0 or 1, and fα,a,B(Pn) = 1 if and only if
a is ranked below B in all n rankings in Pn. It follows that fα,a,B must be the unique level-α UMP test for H0 vs. H1.
By Theorem 1, any most powerful level-α test, in particular fα,a,B , must agree with fα,a,B′ except for the threshold
cases wPn(B
′  a) = K ′α for some K ′α. Choose arbitrary b′ ∈ B′ − B and b ∈ B. Let P ∗n be composed of n
copies of [B  a  others] and let P ′n be composed of n − 1 copies of [b′  B  a  others] and one copy
of [b′  (B − {b})  a  others]. Because wP∗n (B  a) = n|B| > Kα, we have fα,a,B(P ∗n) = 1. This
means that the threshold K ′α for fα,a,B′ is no more than wP∗n (B
′  a) = n|B ∩ B′|. Because n ≥ 2, we have
wP ′n(B
′  a) ≥ n(|B ∩ B′| + 1) − 1 > n|B ∩ B′| = wP ′n(B′  a), which means that fα,a,B(P ′n) = 1. However,
wP ′n(B  a) = n|B| − 1 < n|B|, which is a contradiction because for any profile Pn, fα,a,B(Pn) = 1 if and only if
B  a in all n rankings in Pn. 
Theorem 4. LetMMa denote a Mallows’ model with n = 1, any m ≥ 4, and any ϕ < 1/m. There exists 0 < α < 1
such that no level-α UMP test exists for H0 = (L(A)−H1) vs. H1 = Laothers.
Proof: By Lemma 10, if a UMP test exists then f¯α,a is also a UMP test. Therefore, it suffices to prove that f¯α,a is not
a level-α UMP test. To this end, we explicitly construct a test f and prove that the rankings assigned value 1 are more
cost-effective than that under f¯α,a.
Let V1, V2, . . . , Vm, V ′2 ∈ L(A) denote m + 1 rankings defined as follows. For any j ≤ m, let Vj = [aj  others],
where alternatives in “others” are ranked w.r.t. the increasing order of their subscripts. In other words, Vj is obtained
from V1 by raising alternative aj to the top position. We let V ′3 = [a3  a1  a4  a2  others].
We consider the following critical function f . For any V ∈ Laothers, we let f(V ) = 1. For any Vj with j 6= 3, let
f(Vj) = 1. We then let f(V3) = f(V ′3) =
1+ϕm
1+ϕ . Let α denote the size of f at V2. That is, α = Size(f, V2). Let
T = piV2(Laothers). It follows that
α− T
∝ϕ0 + 1 + ϕ
m
1 + ϕ
(ϕKT(V2,V3) + ϕKT(V2,V
′
3 )) +
m∑
j=5
ϕKT(V2,Vj)
=1 +
1 + ϕm
1 + ϕ
(ϕ3 + ϕ4) + ϕ4 +
m∑
j=5
ϕKT(V2,Vj)
>1 + ϕ3 + ϕ4 + ϕ5
2134
4123
3124
3142
3
4 1
4
4 5
123 132
213 231
312 321
Figure 1: Kentall-Tau distance for some rankings over four alternatives.
For any j, j∗ ≥ 2 such that j 6= j∗, it is not hard to verify that KT(Vj , Vj∗) = j + j∗ − 2. Moreover, KT(V3, V ′3) = 1,
KT(V2, V ′3) = 4, KT(V4, V
′
3) = 4, and for any j ≥ 5, we have KT(V ′3 , Vj) = j + 2. Therefore, we have the following
calculations of Size(f, V3), Size(f, V ′3), and Size(f, V4) (see Figure 1 for distances between V2, V3, V
′
3 , V4). We note
that T = piV2(Laothers) = piV3(Laothers) = piV ′3 (Laothers) = piV4(Laothers) due to symmetry.
Size(f, V3)− T ∝ ϕ3 + 1+ϕ
m
1+ϕ (1 + ϕ) + ϕ
5 +
∑
j=5 ϕ
KT(V3,Vj) ≤ 1 + ϕ3 + (m− 3)ϕ5
Size(f, V ′3)− T ∝ ϕ4 + 1+ϕ
m
1+ϕ (1 + ϕ) + ϕ
4 +
∑
j=5 ϕ
KT(V ′3 ,Vj) ≤ 1 + 2ϕ4 + (m− 4)ϕ6
Size(f, V4)− T ∝ ϕ4 + 1+ϕ
m
1+ϕ (ϕ
4 + ϕ5) + 1 +
∑
j=5 ϕ
KT(V4,Vj) ≤ 1 + 2ϕ4 + (m− 4)ϕ7
For any other h′0 ∈ H0, we have Size(f, h′0)−T ≤ mϕ. Because ϕ < 1/m, we have Size(f) = α. Let P denote a pro-
file that is composed of {V2, V4, . . . , Vm} ∪ 1+ϕ
m
1+ϕ {V3, V ′3}. We next prove that RatioV2,V1(P ) > RatioV2,V1(Tm−2).
Let Zm =
∏m
l=1
1−ϕm
1−ϕ denote the Mallows normalization factor for m alternatives. We have
RatioV2,V1(Tm−2) =
piV1(Tm−2)
piV2(Tm−2)
=
ϕZm−1
Zm−2 + ϕ2(Zm−1 − Zm−2)
=
ϕZm−1Zm−2
1 + ϕ2(Zm−1Zm−2 − 1)
=
ϕ+ ϕ2 + · · ·+ ϕm−1
1 + ϕ3 + ϕ4 + · · ·+ ϕm <
1
ϕ
RatioV2,V1(P ) =
ϕ+ ϕ2 + · · ·+ ϕm−1 + ϕm+2
1 + ϕ3 + ϕ4 + · · ·+ ϕm + ϕm+3
>
ϕ+ ϕ2 + · · ·+ ϕm−1
1 + ϕ3 + ϕ4 + · · ·+ ϕm
=RatioV2,V1(Tm−2)
We note that Size(f¯α,a, V2) = α. This means that Power(f¯α,a, V1) = piV1(Tm−1) + αRatioT2,T1(Tm−2) <
piV1(Tm−1) + αRatioT2,T1(P ) = Power(f, V1). This means that f¯α,a is a not a level-α UMP. The theorem follows
after Lemma 10. 
Theorem 5. LetMMa denote a Mallows’ model with n = 1 and any m ≥ 4. There exists  > 0 such that for any
ϕ > 1−  and any α, f¯α,a is a UMP test for H0 = (L(A)−H1) vs. H1 = Laothers.
Proof: We first verify that when Kα = m − 1, f¯α,a is a UMP test. For any h1 ∈ H1, let h∗0 ∈ H0 denote the
ranking that is obtained from h1 by moving a down for one position. It is not hard to check that for any V ∈ L(A),
Ratioh∗0 ,h1(V ) ≤ 1/ϕ, and for all V ∈ H1 we have Ratioh∗0 ,h1(V ) = 1/ϕ. This means that for any level-α test for
H0 vs. h1, the power cannot be more than α/ϕ. We note that f¯α,a is a level-α test whose power is exactly α/ϕ. This
means that for all h1 ∈ H1, f¯α,a is a most powerful test for H0 vs. h1. Therefore, when Kα = m− 1, f¯α,a is a UMP
test.
For any α such that Kα ≤ m − 2, we will prove that for any h1 ∈ H1, f¯α,a is a most powerful level-α test for H0
vs. h1. This is done in the following steps. Step 1. Find a least favorable distribution Λh1α whose support is the set of
all rankings where a is ranked at the second position. Step 2. Verify that f¯α,a is the likelihood ratio test w.r.t. Λh1α , and
step 3. verify that the two conditions in Lemma 2 holds for Λh1α .
Step 1. The main challenge is that in general there does not exist a uniformly least favorable distribution. For different
α we define different Λh1α as follows. For any α, we let sα denote the smallest Borda score of the ranking V such
that f¯α,a(V ) > 0. We have that sα ≤ m − 2. Let the support of Λh1α be Tm−2, which is the set of rankings where
a is ranked at the second position. We will solve the following system of linear equations to determine Λh1α . For any
h∗0 ∈ Tm−2 there is a variable x[h0, sα].
∀V ∈ Tsα ,
∑
h∗0∈Tm−2
Ratio−1h∗0 ,h1(V ) · x[h
∗
0, sα] = m (LP
h1
sα)
We note that as ϕ → 1, Ratio−1h∗0 ,h1(V ) =
pih∗0 (V )
pih1 (V )
= ϕKT(h
∗
0 ,V )−KT(h1,V ) → 1. Because there are m variables and m
equations, as ϕ→ 1 the solution to LPh1sα converges to ~1. Therefore, there exists  > 0 such that for all ϕ > 1− , the
linear systems {LPh1s : s ≤ m − 1, h1 ∈ H1} all have strictly positive solutions. Let {x∗[h∗0, sα]|V ∈ Tsα} denote a
solution to LPh1sα . For any h
∗
0 ∈ Tm−2, we let Λh1α (h∗0) = x
∗[h∗0 ,sα]∑
h0∈Tm−2 x
∗[h0,sα]
.
Step 2. To simplify notation we let LRα = LRα,Λh1α ,h1 denote the likelihood ratio test and let Ratio = RatioΛh1α ,h1
denote the likelihood ratio function w.r.t. distribution Λh1α for H0 vs. h1. To prove LRα = f¯α,a, we first prove that
for any V ∈ L(A) where a is not ranked at the bottom position, Ratio(V ) > Ratio(Down1a(V )), where we recall that
Down1a(V ) is the ranking obtained from V by moving a down for one position.∑
h∗0∈Tm−2 Λ
h1
α (h
∗
0) · pih∗0 (Down1a(V ))∑
h∗0∈Tm−2 Λ
h1
α (h∗0) · pih∗0 (V )
=
∑
h∗0∈Tm−2 Λ
h1
α (h
∗
0) · ϕKT(h
∗
0 ,Down
1
a(V ))∑
h∗0∈Tm−2 Λ
h1
α (h∗0) · ϕKT(h∗0 ,V )
>
∑
h∗0∈Tm−2 Λ
h1
α (h
∗
0) · ϕKT(h
∗
0 ,V ) · ϕKT(V,Down1a(V ))∑
h∗0∈Tm−2 Λ
h1
α (h∗0) · ϕKT(h∗0 ,V )
=ϕ =
pih1(Down
1
a(V ))
pih1(V )
The strict inequality holds because of (1) triangle inequality for Kentall-Tau distance, and (2) for any ranking
V where the top-ranked alternative in h∗0 is ranked right below a, we have KT(h
∗
0, V ) + KT(V,Down
1
a(V )) >
KT(h∗0,Down
1
a(V )), and (3) for all h
∗
0 ∈ Tm−2, Λh1α (h∗0) > 0.
It follows from the strict inequality that
Ratio(V ) =
pih1(V )∑
h∗0∈Tm−2 Λ
h1
α (h∗0) · pih∗0 (V )
>
pih1(Down
1
a(V ))∑
h∗0∈Tm−2 Λ
h1
α (h∗0) · pih∗0 (Down1a(V ))
=Ratio(Down1a(V ))
Moreover, for any V, V ′ ∈ Tsα we have Ratio(V ) = Ratio(V ′) by verifying LPh1sα . Therefore, for any V ∈ Ti with
i < sα, we can move up the position of a one by one until we reach the (m − sα)-th position. Let V ∗ ∈ Tsα
denote this ranking. It follows that Ratio(V ) < Ratio(V ∗). Similarly for any V ′ ∈ Ti with i > sα we have
Ratio(V ′) > Ratio(V ∗) for any V ∗ ∈ Tsα . This means that for any V where a is ranked above the (m − sα)-th
position, we have LRα(V ) = 1; for any V where a is ranked below the (m− sα)-th position, we have LRα(V ) = 0;
for any V where a is ranked at the (m− sα)-th position, we have that LRα(V ) is the same and is between 0 and 1. It
follows that LRα = f¯α,a.
Step 3. Due to the symmetry fα,a among alternatives in A − {a}, for any i ≤ m − 2 and any h0, h′0 ∈ Ti, we have
Size(f¯α,a, h0) = Size(f¯α,a, h′0). Therefore, condition (i) in Lemma 2 is satisfied. Choose arbitrary h
m−2
0 ∈ Tm−2.
For any i ≤ m− 3, let hi0 ∈ Ti denote the ranking obtained from hi+10 by moving a down for one position. To verify
condition (ii) in Lemma 2, it suffices to prove that for any i ≤ m− 3 and any K ∈ N, we have
pihm−20
({V : Bordaa(V ) ≥ K})
≥ pihi0({V : Bordaa(V ) ≥ K})
(2)
We will prove a slightly stronger lemma.
Lemma 8 Under Mallows’ model, for any m, any ϕ, any W ∈ L(A), any b, c ∈ A such that b W c, and any K, we
have piW ({V : Bordab(V ) ≥ K}) ≥ piW ({V : Bordac(V ) ≥ K}).
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 5. It suffices to prove the lemma for the case where b and c are
adjacent in W . Let P = {V ∈ L(A) : Bordab(V ) ≥ K} and P ′ = {V ∈ L(A) : Bordac(V ) ≥ K}. It follows
that P ∩ P ′ is the set of rankings where both b and c are ranked within top m − K positions; P − P ′ is the set of
rankings where b is ranked within top m−K positions but c is not; and P ′−P is the set of rankings where c is ranked
within top m−K positions but b is not. We letM be a permutation that switches b and c. It is not hard to check that
M is a bijection between (P − P ′) and (P ′ − P), and because b and c are adjacent in W , for any V ∈ P , we have
KT(M(V ),W ) = KT(V,W ) + 1, which means that piW (V ) = pi(M(V ))/ϕ. Therefore, we have
piW ({V : Bordab(V ) ≥ K})− piW ({V : Bordac(V ) ≥ K})
=piW (P)− piW (P ′) = piW (P − P ′)− piW (P ′ − P)
=piW (P − P ′)− piW (M(P − P ′))
=(
1
ϕ
− 1)piW (P − P ′) ≥ 0
This proves the lemma. 
Let W be an arbitrary ranking and let Mi denote a permutation such that Mi(hi0) = W . We have pihi0({V :
Bordaa(V ) ≥ K}) = piMi(hi0)({V : BordaMi(a)(V ) ≥ K}). We note that Mi(a) is the alternative that is ranked
at the (m − i)-th position in W . Inequality (2) follows after applying Lemma 8. This means that condition (ii) in
Lemma 2 is also satisfied. Therefore, by Lemma 2, f¯α,a is a level-α most powerful test for H0 vs. h1. Since f¯α,a does
not depend on h1, it is a level-α UMP test for H0 vs. H1. 
Lemma 6. For anyMX andMY , suppose ΛX is a least favorable distribution for composite vs. simple test (H0,X
vs. x1) underMX . Given y1 ∈ ΘY , let Λ∗ be the distribution over H0,X ×ΘY where for all x ∈ H0,X , Λ∗(x, y1) =
ΛX(x). Then Λ∗ is a least favorable distribution for H0,X ×ΘY vs. (x1, y1) underMX ⊗MY .
Proof: Let x10, . . . , x
K
0 ∈ ΘX denote the support of ΛX . The theorem is proved by applying Lemma 2. For any
0 < α < 1 and any P = (PX , PY ) ∈ SX × SY , we have the following calculation. In this proof Ratio stands for
RatioΛ∗,(x1,y1) and LRα stands for LRα,Λ∗,(x1,y1).
Ratio(PX , PY ) =
pix1,y1(P )∑K
k=1 Λ
∗(xk0 , y1)pi(xk0 ,y1)(P )
=
pix1(PX) · piy1(PY )∑K
k=1 Λ
∗(xk0 , y1)pixk0 (PX) · piy1(PY )
=
pix1(PX)∑K
k=1 Λ(x
k
0)pi
k
x0(PX)
= RatioΛ,x1(PX)
It follows that for any pair of samples (PX , PY ), (P ′X , P
′
Y ) ∈ SX ×SY , Ratio(PX , PY ) ≥ Ratio(P ′X , P ′Y ) if and only
if RatioΛ,x(PX) ≥ RatioΛ,x(P ′X). This means that for any (PX , PY ), LRα(PX , PY ) = LRα,Λ,x1(PX). Therefore,
for any x0 ∈ H0,X , we have
Size(LRα, (x0, y1))
=
∑
(PX ,PY )∈SX×SY
pix0(PX)piy1(PY )LRα(PX , PY )
=
∑
(PX ,PY )∈SX×SY
pix0(PX)piy1(PY )LRα,Λ,x1(PX)
=
∑
PX∈SX
pix0(PX)LRα,Λ,x1(PX)
=Size(LRα,Λ,x1 , x0)
Therefore, by Lemma 2, for any (x∗0, y1) ∈ Spt(Λ∗), we have Size(LRα, (x0, y1)) = Size(LRα,Λ,x1 , x0) = α because
x∗0 ∈ Spt(Λ); for any (x0, y) ∈ H0,X ×ΘY , we have Size(LRα, (x0, y)) = Size(LRα,Λ,x1 , x0) ≤ α. This means that
the two conditions in Lemma 2 are satisfies, which proves the theorem. 
Lemma 7. For any modelMX and any t ∈ N, suppose Λ is a uniformly least favorable distribution for composite
vs. simple test (H0 vs. h1) underMX . Then Ext(Λ, h1, t) is a uniformly least favorable distribution for Ext(H0, h1, t)
vs. ~h1 in (MX)t.
Proof: Again the proof is done by applying Lemma 2. We first prove a claim that characterizes samples whose
likelihood ratio is no more than a given threshold. To this end, it is convenient to use the inverse of the likelihood
ratio. To simplify notation, in this proof we let Λ∗ = Ext(Λ, h1, t), let H∗0 = Ext(H0, h1, t), let LRα = LRα,Λ∗,~h1 ,
Ratio = RatioΛ∗,~h1 .
Claim 1 For any kα and any ~x ∈ St,
∑t
j=1 Ratio
−1
Λ,h1
(xj) = t · Ratio−1(~x).
Proof: we have Ratio−1(~x) = 1t ·
∑t
j=1
∑
h0∈H0 Λ(h0)·pi(h0,[~h1]−j)(~x)
pi~h1
(~x)
= 1t ·
∑t
j=1
∑
h0∈H0 Λ(h0)·pih0 (xj)·pi[~h1]−j (xj)
pih1 (xj)·pi[~h1]−j (xj)
= 1t
∑t
j=1 Ratio
−1
Λ,h1
(xj) 
The next lemma proves the following: For any ~z ∈ H∗0 and any j ≤ t, suppose the j-th component is not in Spt(Λ) ∪
{h1}. If we fix all components except j-th in ~z and change the j-th component to h∗0 ∈ Spt(Λ), then the size of LRα
will increase. If we further change the j-th component to h1, then the size of LRα will further increase.
Lemma 9 For any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, any j ≤ t, any ~z−j ∈ Θt−1, any h0 ∈ H0, and any h∗0 ∈ Spt(Λ), we have
Size(LRα, (h0, ~z−j)) ≤ Size(LRα, (h∗0, ~z−j)) ≤ Size(LRα, (h1, ~z−j)).
Proof: For any ~z−j ∈ Θn−1, we have
Size(LRα, (h0, ~z−j)) = pi(h0,~z−j)({~x ∈ St : Ratio(~x) > k∗α})
+ γ∗αpi(h0,~z−j)({~x ∈ St : Ratio(~x) = k∗α})
For any ~x, we let Sum(~x) =
∑t
l=1 Ratio
−1
Λ,h1
(xl) and for any j ≤ t, we let Sum(~x−j) =
∑
l 6=j Ratio
−1
Λ,h1
(xl). By
Claim 1, we have
pi(h0,~z−j)({~x ∈ St : Ratio(~x) > k∗α})
=pi(h0,~z−j)({~x ∈ St : Sum(~x) < t/k∗α})
=pi(h0,~z−j)({~x ∈ St : Sum(~x−j) + Ratio−1Λ,h1(xj) < t/k∗α})
=
∫ t/k∗α
0
∑
~x−j∈St−1:Sum(~x−j)=p∑
xj :Ratio
−1
Λ,h1
(xj)<t/k∗α−p
pi(h0,~z−j)(~x)dp
=
∫ t/k∗α
0
pi~z−j ({~x−j ∈ St−1 : Sum(~x−j) = p})
· pih0({xj : Ratio−1Λ,h1(xj) < t/k∗α − p})dp
=
∫ t/k∗α
0
Q(~z−j , p) · pih0({xj : Ratio−1Λ,h1(xj) < t/k∗α − p})dp
where Q(~z−j , p) = pi~z−j ({~x−j ∈ St−1 : Sum(~x−j) = p}). Given p and γ∗α, let α′ denote the size of the likelihood
ratio test LRα′,Λ,h1 , where the threshold kα′ is 1/(t/k
∗
α − p) and γα′ = γ∗α. We have
Size(LRα, (h0, ~z−j)) =
∫ t/k∗α
0
Q(~z−j , p) · Size(LRα′,Λ,h1 , h0)dp (3)
We note that in Equation (3), α′ is a function of t, p, k∗α, and γ
∗
α. Because Λ is a uniformly least favorable distribution,
it follows from Lemma 2 that for any h∗0 ∈ Spt(Λ) and any h0 ∈ (H0 − Spt(Λ)), we have
Size(LRα′,Λ,h1 , h0) ≤ α′ ≤ Size(LRα′,Λ,h1 , h∗0)
Then by Equation (3), for any h0 ∈ (H0 − Spt(Λ)) and any h∗0 ∈ Spt(Λ), we have
Size(LRα, (h0, ~z−j))
=
∫ t/k∗α
0
Q(~z−j , p) · Size(LRα′,Λ,h1 , h0)dp
≤
∫ t/k∗α
0
Q(~z−j , p) · Size(LRα′,Λ,h1 , h∗0)dp
=Size(LRα, (h∗0, ~z−j))
To prove the last inequality in the lemma, we prove a claim that holds for any least favorable distribution and the
corresponding likelihood ratio test. The Size(·) function in the claim is extended to h1 ∈ H1 in the natural way.
Claim 2 For any model, any composite vs. simple test (H0 vs. h1), suppose Λ is a level-η least favorable distribution.
Then we have Size(LRη, h1) ≥ η = Size(LRη, hΛ0 ). 4
Proof: For the sake of contradiction suppose this is not true, that is, for any h∗0 ∈ Spt(Λ) we have Size(LRη, h1) <
η = Size(LRη, h∗0). It follows that kη ≤ 1, otherwise we have
Size(LRη, h1)
=
∑
P∈S:Ratio(P )>kη
pih1(P ) + γη
∑
P∈S:Ratio(P )=kη
pih1(P )
≥
∑
P∈S:Ratio(P )>kη
piΛ(P ) · kη + γη
∑
P∈S:Ratio(P )=kη
piΛ(P ) · kη
>
∑
P∈S:Ratio(P )>kη
piΛ(P ) + γη
∑
P∈S:Ratio(P )=kη
piΛ(P ) = η,
which is a contradiction. Therefore, we have
1
=Size(LRη, h1) +
∑
P∈S:Ratio(P )<kη
pih1(P )
+ (1− γη)
∑
P∈S:Ratio(P )=kη
pih1(P )
<η +
∑
P∈S:Ratio(P )<kη
piΛ(P ) · kη
+ (1− γη)
∑
P∈S:Ratio(P )=kη
piΛ(P ) · kη
≤η + kη(1− Size(LRη, hΛ0 )) ≤ 1,
which is a contradiction. 
Applying Claim 2 to LRα′,Λ,h1 , we have
Size(LRα, (h∗0, ~z−j))
=
∫ t/k∗α
0
Q(~z−j , p) · Size(LRα′,Λ,h1 , h∗0)dp
≤
∫ t/k∗α
0
Q(~z−j , p) · Size(LRα′,Λ,h1 , h1)dp
=Size(LRα, (h1, ~z−j))
4We recall that hΛ0 is the combined H0 by Λ.
This finishes the proof of Lemma 9. 
It follows from Lemma 9 that for any j ≤ t and any h∗0 ∈ Spt(Λ), we have that Size(LRα, (h∗0, [~h1]−j)) is the same.
Due to symmetry, for any ~h∗0 ∈ H∗0 , Size(LRα, h∗0) is the same and is therefore equivalent to α. This verifies condition
(i) in Lemma 2.
Condition (ii) in Lemma 2 is verified by recursively applying Lemma 9. Given any ~h0 ∈ H∗0 − Spt(Λ∗), there must
exist j ≤ t such that [~h0]j 6= h1. We then change [~h0]j to an arbitrary h∗0 ∈ Spt(Λ), then change the other components
of ~h0 to h1 one by one. Each time we make the change the size of LRα does not decrease according to Lemma 9.
At the end of the process we obtain (h∗0, [~h1]j) ∈ Spt(Λ∗), at which the size of LRα is α. The theorem follows after
applying Lemma 2. 
We now define a test f¯α,a for H0 = (L(A) −H1) vs. H1 = Laothers and prove that if a UMP test exists, then f¯α,a
must also be a UMP test. For any V ∈ L(A) and any alternative a ∈ A, we let Bordaa(V ) denote the Borda score
of a in V . That is, Bordaa(V ) is the number of alternatives that are ranked below a in V . For any V ∈ L(A), we let
f¯α,a(V ) =
 1 if Bordaa(V ) > Kα0 if Bordaa(V ) < Kα
Γα if Bordaa(V ) = Kα
, where Kα and Γα are chosen so that the size of f¯α,a is α. In other words,
f¯α,a calculates the Borda score of a in the input profile, and if it is larger than a threshold Kα then H0 is rejected. It
is not hard to see that f¯α,a equals to fα′,a with a possibly different level α′ (defined in Theorem 3).
Lemma 10 If there exists a level-α UMP test for H0 = (L(A)−H1) vs. H1 = Laothers, then f¯α,a is also a level-α
UMP test.
Proof: Let fα denote a level-α UMP test. For any permutation M over A− {a}, we let M(fα) denote the test such
that for any V ∈ L(A), M(fα)(V ) = fα(M(V )). Because the Kendall-Tau distance is invariant to permutations,
we have that for any h0 ∈ H0, Size(fα, h0) = Size(M(fα),M(h0)), and for any h1 ∈ H1, Power(fα, h1) =
Power(M(fα),M(h1)). Therefore Size(M(fα)) = α. Also because the multi-set of {Power(fα, h1) : h1 ∈ H1}
is the same as the multi-set {Power(M(fα), h1) : h1 ∈ H1}, for all h1 ∈ H1, we must have Power(fα, h1) =
Power(M(fα), h1), otherwise there exists h1 ∈ H1 such that Power(fα, h1) < Power(M(fα), h1), which contradicts
the assumption that fα is UMP.
It follows that for any permutation M overA−{a}, M(fα) is also UMP. Therefore, f¯α = 1(m−1)!
∑
M M(fα) is also
UMP. We note that for any V, V ′ where a has the same Borda score, there exists a permutation M over A − {a} so
that M(V ) = V ′. This means that f¯α(V ) = f¯α(V ′).
We now prove that f¯α must be f¯α,a as in the statement of the Lemma. More precisely, we will prove that for any V, V ′
such that Bordaa(V ) > Bordaa(V ′), if f¯α(V ′) > 0 then f¯α(V ) = 1. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that this
is not true, and there exist V, V ′ such that s1 = Bordaa(V ) > Bordaa(V ′) = s2, f¯α(V ′) > 0, and f¯α(V ) < 1. For
any s ≤ m − 1, we let Ts denote the set of rankings where the Borda score of a is s. That is, Ts = {V ∈ L(A) :
Bordaa(V ) = s}. We will prove that for any s1 > s2, Ts1 as a whole is more “cost effective” than Ts2 as a whole for
any h0 ∈ H0 against any h1 ∈ H1. More precisely, we will prove that Ratioh0,h1(Ts1) > Ratioh0,h1(Ts2).
For any s ≤ m− 2 and any h0 ∈ Ts, let h1 denote the ranking in Tm−1 = H1 that is obtained from θ by raising a to
the top position. For any Vs1 ∈ Ts1 , we let Downs1−s2a (Vs1) ∈ Ts2 denote the ranking that is obtained from Vs1 by
moving a down for s1 − s2 positions, that is, from the (m− s1)-th position to the (m− s2)-th position. We have
pih0(Ts2)
pih0(Ts1)
=
∑
V ∈Ts2 pih0(V )∑
V ∈Ts1 pih0(V )
=
∑
V ∈Ts1 pih0(Down
s1−s2
a (V ))∑
V ∈Ts1 pih0(V )
=
∑
V ∈Ts1 ϕ
KT(h0,Downs1−s2a (V ))∑
V ∈Ts1 ϕ
KT(h0,V )
>
∑
V ∈Ts1 ϕ
KT(h0,V ) · ϕKT(V,Downs1−s2a (V ))∑
V ∈Ts1 ϕ
KT(h0,V )
=ϕs1−s2 =
pih1(Ts2)
pih1(Ts1)
The inequality is due to triangle inequality for Kendall-Tau distance. It is strict because for any V ∈ Ts1 where the
top-ranked alternative in h0 is ranked between the (m− s1)-th and (m− s2)-th position, KT(h0,Downs1−s2a (V )) <
KT(h0, V ) + KT(V,Downs1−s2a (V )). Therefore,
pih0 (Ts2 )
pih0 (Ts1 )
>
pih1 (Ts2 )
pih1 (Ts1 )
, which means that Ratioh0,h1(Ts1) =
pih1 (Ts1 )
pih0 (Ts1 )
>
pih1 (Ts2 )
pih0 (Ts2 )
= Ratioh0,h1(Ts2).
Therefore, we can find sufficiently small , δ > 0, and replace Ts2 by δTs1 without changing the size. This will
increase the power of f¯α because Ts1 is strictly more cost effective than Ts2 , which contradicts the assumption that f¯α
is a UMP test. Therefore, f¯α = f¯α,a, which proves the lemma. 
